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Abstract. Most of the theories on formalising intention interpret it as a unary
modal operator in Kripkean semantics, which gives it a monotonic look. We argue
that policy-based intentions [8] exhibit non-monotonic behaviour which could be
captured through a non-monotonic system like defeasible logic. To this end we
outline a defeasible logic of intention. The proposed technique alleviates most of
the problems related to logical omniscience.
1 Introduction
Formalising cognitive states like intention has received much attention within the AI
community [7, 18, 19, 22]. All these theories are based on Normal Modal Logics (NMLs),
where intention is formalised into a modal operator on the framework of kripkean pos-
sible world semantics. Due to this restriction, these theories suffer from the logical om-
niscience problem [10, 21]. One of the solutions suggested to overcome this problem is
to adopt a non-kripkean semantics as shown in [5]. In that work intention is interpreted
in terms of its content and the intention consequence relation is explained based on the
content of two intentions. There is also a representationalist theory of intention [11]
that employs the minimal model semantics [4] to interpret the intention operator. Work
has also been done relating intention to preferences [20] as well as commitments [6, 17].
However none of these theories have explicitly addressed the need for a non-monotonic
theory of intention and we argue that to capture the properties involved in policy-based
intention we need such a non-monotonic setup.
Our claim is based on Bratman’s [8] classification of Intention as Deliberative, non-
deliberative, Policy-based and we show that policy-based intention is non-monotonic
(i.e. has a defeasible nature). Though, many of the theories mentioned above is based
on Bratman’s work, they fail to recognize the non-monotonic component involved in
intention. We believe that our approach helps in bringing together the area of non-
monotonic reasoning and reasoning about intention. In this paper we adopt a particular
non-monotonic system (defeasible logic) to study the properties involved in policy-
based intention. The reason for defeasible logic is due to its computational efficiency
[12] and easy implementation [13]. We are unaware of any existing work relating rea-
soning about intention with non-monotonic reasoning to the best of our knowledge.
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The proposed method provides solution to the problem of logical omniscience which
usually accompanies intention-formalisms based on NMLs. The use of non-monotonic
logics in intention reasoning allows the agent to reason with partial knowledge without
having a complete knowledge of the environment. This also helps the agent in avoiding
a complete knowledge of the consequences. We also try to show how the new approach
could provide an explanation on the practical nature of intentional systems like BDI
[18]. In this paper we don’t want to recast the whole BDI theory but focus on the inten-
tion part supplemented by the factual knowledge and its underlying theory. Moreover
similar considerations can be applied to the belief and desire components.
2 The Case for Non-Monotonic Reasoning
An important classification of intention that is useful in computer science is that of In-
tending versus doing intentionally [16], where the former involves the true intentions or
preferences of the agent whereas the latter applies to the actions or states that the agent
performs or brings about but not with any prior intention to do so. Based on this division
Bratman classifies Intentions as deliberative, non-deliberative and policy-based. When
an agent i has an intention of the form INTt1i ϕ, t2 (read as agent i intends at t1 to ϕ
at t2) as a process of present deliberation, then it is called deliberative intention. On
the other hand if the agent comes to have such an intention not on the basis of present
deliberation, but at some earlier time t0 and have retained it from t0 to t1 without recon-
sidering it then it is called non-deliberative. There can be a third case when intentions
can be general and concern potentially recurring circumstances in an agent’s life. Such
general intentions constitute policy-based intentions, and is defined as follows: when
the agent i has a general-(policy/intention) to ϕ in circumstances of type ψ and i notes
at t1 that i am (will be) in a ψ-type circumstance at t2, and thereby arrive at an inten-
tion to ϕ at t2. The difference here is that there is no present deliberation concerning
the action to be performed as the agent already has a general intention to do a particu-
lar action (doing intentionally). Whether the agent is able to perform that action or not
depends on the circumstances.
When dealing with such general policies/intentions (hereafter intention), we have
to take into account two cases. General intentions could be either (1) periodic or (2)
circumstance-triggered. They are periodic in the sense that their occasion for execution
is guaranteed by the mere passage of a specific interval of time. For instance, the gen-
eral intention of patching up and rebooting the Unix server, kurango in our department
on every Friday at 7PM. In contrast to this, general intention could be circumstance
triggered as in the case of being Super-User if one is Root. Its occasion is not guaran-
teed by the mere passage of time but require that certain specific circumstances obtain.
In both cases one can find that the general intention has an underlying defeasible na-
ture. The defeasible nature is explained as follows. Consider the above example for
circumstance-triggered general intention:
SU(X)⇒ Root(X) (1)
which means, (super-users are typically root). Suppose, there exists an agent i (a soft-
ware program) that monitors tasks related to giving root permissions as and according to
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whether a user is a normal-user (NU) or Super-User (SU) and i has a general intention
like 1. This general intention has a defeasible nature in the sense that, if i knows that
X is a SU then i may conclude that X is Root, unless there is other evidence suggest-
ing that X may not be root (for instance, when X has only read and write permissions
but not execute permission). But this does not mean that the agent i should know all
such conditions but, only those he considers necessary to the intended outcome and that
he/she isn’t confident of their being satisfied. Hence our definition of general intention
boils down to:
An agent intends all the necessary consequences of his performing his general
intention and he isn’t confident of their being satisfied.
In order to intend the necessary consequence the agent has to make sure that all the
evidence to the contrary has been defeated which basically is a defeasible logic conclu-
sion. This is different from the usual NML interpretation where the agent intends all the
consequences. The formation of such general policies helps in extending the influence
of deliberation as it is a partial solution to the problems posed by our limited resources
for calculation and deliberation at the time of action. General policies also facilitate
co-ordination. It may sometimes be easier to appreciate expectable consequences (both
good and bad) of general ways of acting in recurrent circumstances than to appreciate
the expectable consequences of a single case.
3 Logical Omniscience and Non-Monotonicity
As we mentioned before, most of the theories based on NMLs interpret intention as a
unary modal operator in Kripkean semantics which makes it vulnerable to the problem
of logical omniscience. The problem in its general form as stated in [21] is as follows:
1. |= Xϕ ∧ X(ϕ→ ψ)⇒ Xψ (side-effect problem)
2. |= ϕ→ ψ ⇒|= Xϕ→ Xψ (side-effect problem)
3. |= ϕ⇔ ψ ⇒|= Xϕ⇔ Xψ (side-effect problem)
4. |= ϕ⇒|= Xϕ (transference-problem)
5. |= (Xϕ ∧ Xψ)→ X(ϕ ∧ ψ) (unrestricted combining)
6. |= Xϕ→ X(ϕ ∨ ψ) (unrestricted weakening)
7. |= ¬(Xϕ ∧ X¬ϕ)
None of these properties except for (7) is valid when we take intention into consider-
ation. For instance, consider a situation where an agent i goes to the bookstore with
the intention of buying a paper-back and also with the intention of buying a magazine
because he has a general intention to buy them.1 Hence according to (5) it could be
formally given as:
|= INTi(paperback) ∧ INTi(magazine)→ INTi(paperback ∧ magazine)
But this general intention is defeasible in the sense that at the bookstore the agent might
find that he doesn’t have enough money to buy both of them and hence drops intention
1 The example is a slightly modified one as given in [20].
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to buy each of them and now only intends to buy one of them. NMLs fail to account
for such type of reasoning. In Sugimoto [20] an extra notion of preference is added and
an ordering among the preferences is done to capture the desired effect. But we argue
that, in general, such intentions are defeasible and hence a non-monotonic reasoning
system would be more efficient for such occasions. The above example could be stated
in a non-monotonic setup as
(1) paper-back(X) ⇒ buy(X)
(2) magazine(X) ⇒ buy(X)
(3) costly(X) ; ¬buy(X)
where (1) and (2) are premises which reflects the agents general intention of buying a
paper-back and magazine unless there is other evidence like (3) suggesting that he/she
may not be able to buy. When intention is formalised in the background of NMLs it
is often the case that the agent has to have a complete description of the environment
before-hand or has to be omniscient in the sense of knowing all the consequences. Clas-
sically the logical omniscience problem amounts to say that an agent has to compute
all consequences of its own theory. It is obvious that some of the consequences are not
intended as shown above. Moreover in classical NML the set of consequences is infi-
nite. Hence we need a system like DL (defeasible logic) which is easily implementable
and where the set of consequences consists of the set of literals occurring in the agent
theory i.e. in the knowledge base, which is finite.
4 Overview of Defeasible Logic
As shown in the previous section, reasoning about general intention has a defeasible
nature (in the sense that it is fallible) and hence we need an efficient and easily im-
plementable system to capture the required defeasible instances. Defeasible logic, as
developed by Nute [15, 14] with a particular concern about computational efficiency
and developed over the years by [3, 2, 1] is our choice. The reason being easy imple-
mentation [13], flexibility [1] (it has a constructively defined and easy to use proof
theory) and it is efficient: It is possible to compute the complete set of consequences of
a given theory in linear time [12]. We do not address any semantic issues in this paper
but the argumenataion semantics as given in [9] could be straightforwardly extended to
the prsent case.
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of DL. A defeasible theory contains
five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a
superiority relation. We consider only essentially propositional rules. Rules containing
free variables are interpreted as the set of their variable-free instances.
Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Vineet is a System Administrator”.
In the logic, this might be expressed as SA(vineet).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
(e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “System-Administrators
are Super-Users”. Written formally:
SA(X)→ SU(X).
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Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “Super-Users are typically root”; written formally:
SU(X)⇒ Root(X).
The idea is that if we know that someone is a super-user, then we may conclude that
he/she is root, unless there is other evidence suggesting that it may not be root.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to
prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules
by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “If a user is normal-user then he
might not be a root”. Formally:
NU(X); ¬Root(X).
The main point is that the information that a user is NU is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that he/she is not root. It is only evidence that the user may not be able to
become root. In other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬root if NU , we simply want
to prevent a conclusion Root.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that
is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the
defeasible rules
r : SU ⇒ Root
r′ : RW ⇒ ¬Root
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a
Super-User with a read & write permission can be root. But if we introduce a superiority
relation>with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude that the Super-User cannot be root.
The superiority relation is required to be acyclic. It turns out that we only need to define
the superiority relation over rules with contradictory conclusions.
It is not possible in this short paper to give a complete formal description of the
logic. However, we hope to give enough information about the logic to make the dis-
cussion intelligible. We refer the reader to [14, 3, 2] for more thorough treatments.
A rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the
empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent (or head) C(r)
which is a literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs,
the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd,
and the set of defeaters inR byRdft.R[q] denotes the set of rules inR with consequent
q. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then
∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of facts, R a finite
set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R.
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q, which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only
facts and strict rules).
−∆q, which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely prov-
able in D.
+∂q, which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
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−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable
in D.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D = (F,R,>). A
derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of tagged literals satisfying four
conditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclu-
sion). P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
The definition of ∆ describes just forward chaining of strict rules. For a literal q to be
definitely provable we need to find a strict rule with head q, of which all antecedents
have been definitely proved previously. And to establish that q cannot be proven def-
initely we must establish that for every strict rule with head q there is at least one
antecedent which has been shown to be non-provable.
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us work through this condition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have two
choices: (1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using
the defeasible part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or
defeasible rule with head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to consider
possible “attacks”, that is, reasoning chains in support of ∼q. To be more specific: to
prove q defeasibly we must show that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we
must consider the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which have
head ∼q (note that here we consider defeaters, too, whereas they could not be used to
support the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation of defeaters given earlier).
Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, each such
rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the following properties: (i)
t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus each attack
on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule. In other words, r and
the rules t form a team (for q) that defeats the rules s. In an analogus manner we can
define −∂q as
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−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s.
The purpose of the −∂ inference rules is to establish that it is not possible to prove +∂.
This rule is defined in such a way that all the possibilities for proving +∂q (for exam-
ple) are explored and shown to fail before −∂q can be concluded. Thus conclusions
tagged with −∂ are the outcome of a constructive proof that the corresponding positive
conclusion cannot be obtained.
5 Defeasible Logic for Intentions
As we have seen in section 3 NMLs have been put forward to capture the intensional
nature of mental attitudes such as, for example, intention. Usually modal logics are
extensions of classical propositional logic with some intensional operators. Thus any
classical (normal) modal logic should account for two components: (1) the underlying
logical structure of the propositional base and (2) the logic behavior of the modal oper-
ators. Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional logic is not well suited to deal with
real life scenarios. The main reason is that the descriptions of real-life cases are, very
often, partial and somewhat unreliable. In such circumstances classical propositional
logic might produce counterintuitive results insofar as it requires complete, consistent
and reliable information. Hence any modal logic based on classical propositional logic
is doomed to suffer from the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how modalities can be introduced and
manipulated. The common rules for modalities are
` ϕ
` 2ϕNecessitation
` ϕ ⊃ ψ
` 2ϕ ⊃ 2ψRM
Consider the necessitation rule of normal modal logic which dictates the condition that
an agent knows all the valid formulas and thereby all the tautologies. Such a formalisa-
tion might suit for the knowledge an agent has but definitely not for the intention part.
Moreover an agent need not be intending all the consequences of a particular action it
does. It might be the case that it is not confident of them being successful. Thus the two
rules are not appropriate for a logic of intention.
A logic of policy-based intention should take care of the underlying principles gov-
erning such intentions. It should have a notion of the direct and indirect knowledge of
the agent, where the former relates to facts as literals whereas the latter to that of the
agent’s theory of the world in the form of rules. Similarly the logic should also be able
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to account for general intentions as well as the policy-based (derived ones) intentions
of the agent.
Accordingly a defeasible intention theory is a structure (F,RK , RI , >) where, as
usual F is a set of facts, RK is a set of rules for knowledge (i.e., →K , ⇒K ,;K), RI
is a set of rules for intention (i.e., →I , ⇒I , ;I ), and >, the superiority relation, is a
binary relation over the set of rules (i.e., > ⊆ (RK ∪RI)2). Intuitively, given an agent
a, RK corresponds to the agent’s theory of the world, while RI encodes its policy.
In order to correctly capture the notion of intention we extend the signature of the
logic with the modal operator INT; thus if l is literal then INTl and ¬INTl are modal
literals. However we impose some restrictions on the form of the rules: modal literals
can only occur in the antecedents of rules for intention.
Derivability for knowledge (±∆K , ±∂K) has the same conditions as those given
for derivability in Section 4. It is true that the complete and accurate definition of the
inference conditions is cumbersome but the intuition is natural and easy to understand.
The conditions for deriving an intention are as follows:
+∆I : if P (i+ 1) = +∆Ip then
(1) INTp ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RKs [p]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆Ia ∈ P (1..i) or
(3) ∃r ∈ RIs [p] such that
(3.1) ∀INTa ∈ A(r) : +∆Ia ∈ P (1..i) and
(3.2) ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆Ka ∈ P (1..i).
To prove a strong intention, we need either that the intention is unconditional (1), or
that we have a strict rule for intention (an irrevocable policy) whose antecedent is in-
disputable (3). However we have anoter case (2): if an agent knows that B is an in-
disputable consequence of A, and it strongly intends A, then it must intend B. This is
in contrast with the NML interpretation whereby the agent has to intend all the conse-
quences of his/her intention.
−∆I : if P (i+ 1) = −∆Ip then
(1) INTp /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RKs [p]
(2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆Ka ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆Ia ∈ P (1..i); and
(3) ∀r ∈ RIs [p] either
(3.1) ∃INTa ∈ A(r) : −∆Ia ∈ P (1..i) or
(3.2) ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆Ka ∈ P (1..i).
To prove that a stong intention A does not hold (−∆IA), first, A should not be a basic
intention (1); then we have to discard all possible reasons in favour of it. If A is a
definite consequence of B, that is B →K A ∈ RK , we can disprove it if we can
show that (2.1) B is not the case (i.e., −∆KB) or (2.2) B is not strongly intended
(i.e., −∆IB). In case of strict policies for A (3), such as, for example the strict rule for
intention INTB,C →I A, we have to show that either B is not strongly intentended
(3.1), or the fact triggering the policy is not the case (3.2).
+∂I : if P (i+ 1) = +∂Ip then
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(1) +∆Ip ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) −∆K∼p,−∆I∼p ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) either
(2.2.1) ∃r ∈ RKsd[p]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂Ia ∈ P (1..i), or
(2.2.2) ∃r ∈ RIsd[p] ∀INTa ∈ A(s) : +∂Ia ∈ P (1..i) and
∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂Ka ∈ P (1..i); and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼p] either
(2.3.1) if s ∈ RK [∼p] then
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂Ia ∈ P (1..i) and
∃b ∈ A(s) : −∂Kb ∈ P (1..i); and
if s ∈ RI [∼p] then either
∃INTa ∈ A(s) : −∂Ia ∈ P (1..i) or
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂Ka ∈ P (1..i); or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[p] such that t > s and
if t ∈ RK [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ka or
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ia; and
if t ∈ RI [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ka and
∀INTa ∈ A(t) : +∂Ia.
The conditions for proving defeasible intentions are essentially the same as those given
for defeasible derivations in section 4. The only difference is that at each stage we have
to check for two cases, namely: (1) the rule used is a rule for an intention; (2) the
rule is a rule for knowledge. In the first case we have to verify that factual antecedent
are defeasibly proved/disproved using knowledge (±∂K), and intentional antecedent
are defeasibly proved/disproved using intention (±∂i). In the second case we have to
remember that a conslusion of a factual rule can be transformed in an intention if all the
literals in the antecendent are defeasibly intended.
−∂I : if P (i+ 1) = −∂Ip then
(1) −∆Ip ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) +∆K∼p or +∆I∼p ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) both
(2.2.1) ∀r ∈ RKsd[p] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂Ka ∈ P (1..i), and
∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂Ia ∈ P (1..i); and
(2.2.2) ∀r ∈ RIsd[p] ∃INTa ∈ A(s) : −∂Ia ∈ P (1..i) or
∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂Ka ∈ P (1..i); or
(2.3) (2.3.1) ∃s ∈ RK [∼p] ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂Ka or
∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂Ia, or
∃s ∈ RK [∼p] ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂Ka and
∀INTa ∈ A(s) : +∂Ia; and
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R[p] such that t > s and
if t ∈ RK [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ka or
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ia; and
if t ∈ RI [p] then ∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂Ka or
∀INTa ∈ A(t) : +∂Ia.
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The intuition behind the definiton of−∂I is a combination of the motivation for−∂ and
the intuition of −∆I .
We want to illustrate some of the aspects of derivability by means of examples. If
it does not rain we intend to play cricket, and if we intend to play cricket we intend to
stay outdoor. This example can be formalized as follows
¬rain ⇒I cricket
INTcricket ⇒I outdoor
Once the fact ¬rain is supplied we can derive +∂Icricket , and then the intention of
staying outdoor (+∂Ioutdoor ). However the same intention cannot be derived if the
fact cricket is given.
If Vineet intend to travel to Italy then he intend to travel to Europe since Italy is in
Europe. This argument can be formalized as
Italy →K Europe
plus the basic intention INTItaly . The conclusion +∆IEurope follows from clause (2)
of +∆I .
6 Revisiting Commitment Strategies and Intention
Reconsiderations
In the preceding section we showed how to account for a defeasible logic of intention.
This section tries to relate the new theory with an intensional system like BDI and tries
to answer questions related to intention-reconsideration and commitment in such sys-
tems. As noted earlier we are concerned only with the intention part and we assume the
existence of factual knowledge. A major issue in the design of agents that are based on
the models of intention is that of when to reconsider intentions. An agent cannot simply
maintain an intention, once adopted, without ever stopping to reconsider. It is neces-
sary from time to time for an agent to check whether the intention has been achieved
or whether it is no longer achievable. All the existing models of intentional systems are
based on deliberative or non-deliberative theory of intention where reconsideration of
intention is hard as the deliberation time required for such an act is huge. Whereas in
the case of our policy-based intention framework the defeasibility of general intentions
makes it possible to block the application of the intention to the particular case without
abandoning/reconsidering the intention. For example, the software program i, as men-
tioned in the first section, does not give up the general intention of SU(X)⇒ Root(X),
as soon as it finds that the user doesn’t have root permissions but will block the applica-
tion to the particular case. It is also the case that the four different types of conclusion in
DL helps to solve the issue as to when an intention should be dropped. An intention is
dropped when it is either proved definitely (+∆) or cannot be proved definitely (−∆).
The two defeasible rules (+∂) and (−∂) allows the agent to have sufficient deliberation
upon its intention.
In [18] three different commitment strategies, blind, single-minded and open-minded
has been defined. A blindly committed agent maintains her intentions until she believes
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that she has achieved them. This could be contrasted with the defeasible logic con-
clusion of definitely proving, where the inference is made from facts and strict rules.
Hence a blindly committed agent will maintain her intention forever until he/she is able
to prove it definitely (+∆). On the other hand a single-minded agent maintains her in-
tention as long as she believes her intentions to be achievable. This means that the agent
maintains her intentions as long as it is definitely provable (+∆) or not definitely prov-
able (−∆). Finally, an open-minded agent maintains her intentions as long as these
intentions are her goals which means that as long as they could be achieved through
either one of the inference mechanisms.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
Based on Bratman’s classification of intention, we have outlined a policy-based the-
ory of intention which differs from the usual NML-based approaches in the sense
of having a non-monotonic nature. To capture the properties involved in such inten-
tions we adopted defeasible logic as the non-monotonic reasoning mechanism due
to its efficiency and easy implementation as well as the defeasible nature of policy-
based intentions. We pointed out that some of the problems related to intention re-
consideration could be easily understood through such an approach. The commitment
strategy adopted by different types of agents was reviewed in the light of the new ap-
proach. Policy-based reasoning is gaining momentum as an active research area. Many
new applications in emerging information technologies have advanced needs for man-
aging relations such as authorisation, trust and control among interacting agents (hu-
mans or artificial). This necessitates new models and mechanisms for structuring and
flexible management of those relations. The issues of automated management of or-
ganisations in terms of policies and trust relations in highly dynamic and decentralised
environments has become the focus in recent years.
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